Vladimir Putin, Campaign
Finance Reform, and the Central
Meaning of the First Amendment
John T. Valauri ∗
If we advert to the nature of Republican Government, we shall find that
the censorial power is in the people over the Government, and not in the
1
Government over the people.

This is an Article occasioned by the Supreme Court’s important
campaign finance reform decision in McConnell v. Federal Election
2
Commission. But unlike most other articles with which it shares this
genesis, it is not mainly about that case. Instead, this Article takes on
a broader concern and examines and decries the drift away from
traditional and foundational First Amendment and other
constitutional doctrine, and the slouching toward more egalitarian
and managerial notions of free speech and democratic government,
for which the McConnell opinion is an avatar.
In contrast to other critiques of campaign finance reform, I
hope to do more than just raise free speech objections. That sort of
approach has two main faults—it needlessly limits the purchase and
force of one’s critical arguments and it invites easy counterpunching
replies. The complaint that campaign finance reform measures
unduly restrict free speech will receive the reply (for example, from
Justice Breyer) that money is not speech (or, at least, is not just
speech) and that, even if it is, the need to protect governmental and
∗
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1
4 ANNALS OF CONG. 934 (1794) (statement of Rep. Madison). This line is also
quoted twice by Justice Brennan in his opinion for the United States Supreme Court
in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 275, 282 (1964).
2
540 U.S. 93 (2003) (largely upholding against constitutional challenge the
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81
[hereinafter BCRA], also known as the McCain–Feingold Act) (to be codified
primarily in scattered sections of 2 and 47 U.S.C.).
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3

electoral integrity justifies the restrictions. A truer measure of the
relative merit and weight of the arguments on both sides of the
campaign finance reform issue requires a wider perspective than the
4
one provided by the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment
alone. It requires a perspective that spans the breadth of the entire
Constitution because the campaign finance reform that Congress has
given us and which the Supreme Court has largely upheld is
inconsistent with popular self-rule—the republican form of
5
government that the Constitution establishes.
6
Granted, the Guarantee Clause itself assures only the states a
republican form of government. But while not stated in the same
7
form, such a requirement on the federal level was both intended by
8
the Framers and put into the Constitution itself in provisions such as
9
the Preamble and the Free Speech, Assembly, and Petition Clauses of
10
the First Amendment. Would it not be a very strange thing if the
3

Justice Breyer, in a concurring opinion, stated in Nixon v. Shrink Missouri
Government PAC:
On the one hand, a decision to contribute money to a campaign
is a matter of First Amendment concern—not because money is speech
(it is not); but because it enables speech. . . .
On the other hand, restrictions upon the amount any one
individual can contribute to a particular candidate seek to protect the
electoral process—the means through which a free society
democratically translates political speech into concrete governmental
action.
Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 400–01 (2000) (Breyer, J.,
concurring); see also infra note 14.
4
“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech[.]” U.S.
CONST. amend. I.
5
The Court has itself, at times, recognized this broader perspective, for example
in saying, “speech concerning public affairs is more than self-expression; it is the
essence of self-government.” Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74–75 (1964).
6
“The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican
Form of Government[.]” U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
7
For, if it were, the federal government would be guaranteeing itself a
republican form of government.
8
As it was, for example, by James Madison in the headnote to this Article. See
supra note 1 and accompanying text.
9
The Preamble to the United States Constitution provides:
We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect
Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the
common defense, promote the general Welfare, and secure the
Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and
establish this Constitution for the United States of America.
U.S. CONST. pmbl.
10
“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech . . . or the
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Constitution guaranteed only the states, but not the nation, a
republican form of government?
I do not offer a full definition or description of a republican
form of government because I do not need one for my purposes
11
here. But I do mean, at least, to include the idea behind Madison’s
aphorism introducing this Article, that, in a republic, the “censorial
power,” along with other aspects of self-government, belongs to the
12
people and not to their representatives.
But a republican form of government is not a pure or direct
13
democracy; it is, instead, a representative democracy. This is the
reason that the censorial power is so important: it is needed to ensure
that the people and not their representatives rule. Any weakening of
this power threatens and undermines the popular self-rule so critical
to the republican form of government. If we were a direct rather
than a representative democracy (like ancient Athens or a New
England town meeting), the people’s censorial power would lack this
importance, for the right would then only be that of the people to
criticize themselves. I belabor this point because the egalitarian
proponents of campaign finance reform sometimes act and talk as if
14
we had a direct democracy here in the United States. This manifests
right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a
redress of grievances.” U.S. CONST. amend. I.
11
The Supreme Court itself has held the matter, in some aspects, to be a
nonjusticiable political question. For example, in Luther v. Borden, the Court
specifically found:
[A]ccording to the institutions of this country, the sovereignty in every
State resides in the people of the State, and . . . they may alter and
change their form of government at their own pleasure. But whether
they have changed it or not by abolishing an old government, and
establishing a new one in its place, is a question to be settled by the
political power. And when that power has decided, the courts are
bound to take notice of its decision, and to follow it.
Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 47 (1849).
12
The censorial power here is nothing more than the power to command or
regulate. So, the meaning of Madison’s statement in the headnote to this Article is
only that in the United States the people command the government and not the
reverse. But the fundamental postulate of popular sovereignty that this embodies is
crucial to the central meaning of the First Amendment and to our system of
government generally.
13
On this score, Vincent Blasi reminds us that “Article One, the Republican
Form of Government Clause, and the Seventeenth Amendment guarantee to the
People of the United States and of the individual states that they shall be governed by
representatives.” Vincent Blasi, Free Speech and the Widening Gyre of Fund-Raising: Why
Campaign Spending Limits May Not Violate the First Amendment After All, 94 COLUM. L.
REV. 1281, 1283 (1994).
14
Speech is relatively easy and inexpensive in a direct democracy, such as a town
meeting. But in a large, representative democracy like our own, communication is
cumbersome and expensive. If political expenditures and contributions there are
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itself, as we will see, not just in their disvaluing of the censorial power,
but also in their penchant for managerial and parliamentary tropes
15
for political and electoral debate. Their misguided conception of
American democracy also causes these proponents to overlook the
fact that in elections within a representative democracy, most citizens
participate (if at all), not as speakers, but as listeners and financial
contributors.
I proffer the notion of self-government by the people as the
touchstone of our constitutional form of government, one that
cannot be impinged upon or denied whatever the purported benefit.
That done, I argue that campaign finance reform as it has been
theorized, practiced, and defended by its contemporary proponents
violates this basic notion of self-government by displacing the
“censorial power” away from the people to the federal government.
For as Madison said in another context, “[a]n interpretation that
16
destroys the very characteristic of the Government cannot be just.”
How is it that wiser, more experienced heads than mine seem
largely to have overlooked this touchstone of self-government? There
are two explanations. First, it is hidden in plain sight, but in our
clause-bound world of constitutional interpretation, larger, more
17
basic considerations often escape notice. Purpose is rarely explicit
in what we do, but if we interpret rightly, it is always implicit. Take,
for example, Philip Bobbitt’s standard typology of constitutional

limited, speech, too, will suffer. Of the debate over whether money is speech, Justice
Breyer says, “Money is not speech, it is money. But the expenditure of money
enables speech; and that expenditure is often necessary to communicate a message,
particularly in a political context. A law that forbids the expenditure of money to
convey a message could effectively suppress that communication.” Stephen Breyer,
Our Democratic Constitution, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 245, 252 (2002).
15
Those who would limit campaign finance and electoral expression in the name
of political equality of voters or civic education inevitably violate Madison’s proviso
by casting government in a managerial role overseeing and regulating political
debate. And, as Robert Post notes, “The question of whether election speech should
be characterized as within such a managerial domain, or instead as within public
discourse, is a question that affects the meaning and scope of public discourse.”
Robert Post, Regulating Election Speech Under the First Amendment, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1837,
1840 (1999) (footnote omitted).
16
2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1946 (Joseph Gales ed., 1791) (remarks of Rep. Madison in
consideration of a bill to establish the Bank of the United States).
17
However, on occasion, justices do refer to constitutional foundations. For
example, Chief Justice Rehnquist’s opinion for the Court in United States v. Lopez, 514
U.S. 549 (1995), begins, “We start with first principles. The Constitution creates a
Federal Government of enumerated powers.” Id. at 552.
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18

argument. The touchstone of popular self-government is not one of
Bobbitt’s five types of argument (history, text, structure, prudence,
and doctrine), but it is present as the reason or justification for these
types. They maintain the censorial power of the people while
they inhibit its usurpation by the government. Second, throughout
American history there have been relatively few serious challenges to
our republican form of government. That is, in part, why I chose a
wide range of examples in both place and time, from the Sedition Act
19
in the 1790’s to New York Times Co. v. Sullivan to contemporary
Russia, to elucidate the fundamental importance of self-government
in thinking about campaign finance reform, the central meaning of
the First Amendment, and the Constitution generally. My task here
will be as much one of reorientation and refocusing of perspective as
it will be one of argument and persuasion. The argument will take us
to Vladimir Putin’s Russia as well as to John Adams’ America in
addition to the more familiar forum of modern Supreme Court
decisions, but always for the same purpose of demonstrating the
fundamental importance of the touchstone of self-government in
thinking about campaign finance reform, the central meaning of the
First Amendment, and the Constitution generally.
VLADIMIR PUTIN AND CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM
Let me start by comparing two seemingly unrelated events that
took place in the second week of December 2003. One, the Court’s
decision in McConnell, has an obvious link to our subject. The other,
the legislative election in Russia, does not. Both events, however, are
related to my topic.
On Sunday, December 7, 2003, Russia held parliamentary
elections in which United Russia, the party supporting Russian
President Vladimir Putin, inflicted a resounding defeat on the
20
opposition parties, although outside observers questioned the
21
fairness of the process. The New York Times editorial writers seemed
18

Bobbitt divides constitutional argument into five forms: historical, textual,
structural, prudential, and doctrinal. See PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE 7
(1982).
19
376 U.S. 254 (1964) (striking down libel judgment won by public official on
free speech and free press grounds).
20
The New York Times story on the election stated, “Mr. Putin’s party crushed the
Communists and ousted all but a handful of liberal democrats from Parliament,
capturing the most votes of any party in any election since the collapse of the Soviet
Union in 1991.” Steven Lee Myers, Putin Revels in Election; Others See Flaws, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 9, 2003, at A10.
21
The New York Times detailed the report of two European election monitoring
groups, which concluded that the election “called into question Russia’s willingness
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determined to put the best possible face on things. Though
mentioning
some
shortcomings,
the
editors
found
it
“[h]eartening . . . to see Russians voting freely” and emphasized the
“good news” that these elections were freer than their Soviet
22
predecessors. What they found “most troubling” was not the defects
in the process itself, but the fact that “so many of the candidates are
the new rich, leaving the distinct air of tycoons and oligarchs brazenly
23
buying access to power—or to more wealth.”
The New York Times’ own columnist, William Safire, provided the
needed corrective to this dose of editorial see-no-evil later in the week
with an op-ed that began with the cold-water assertion that, “[b]y
taking over the mass media and seizing the political opposition’s
source of funds, Vladimir Putin and his K.G.B. cohort have brought
24
back one-party rule to Russia.” Of the big-money-backed candidates,
Safire wrote, “The money needed to organize parties and put up a
campaign against an entrenched government came from an
admittedly unsavory source: the rich oligarchs out to protect their ill25
gotten fortunes from confiscation by the state.” Safire corrected his
editors’ opinion that the election was, on balance, a plus for
democracy, and the implication that moneyed influences constituted
a bigger threat to fair and democratic elections than did one-party
26
rule.
The second news story from that week concerned the Supreme
Court’s landmark campaign finance reform decision in McConnell on
December 10, three days after the Russian election. The New York
Times’ editors hailed the Court’s upholding of the Bipartisan
Campaign Finance Reform Act (BCRA) as “A Campaign Finance
Triumph” that “closed two gaping loopholes in campaign finance
law . . . [namely,] ‘soft money,’ the unlimited, and often very sizable
contributions to political parties . . . [and] sham ‘issue ads’. . . [that]
purported to be about political issues but were actually intended to
27
help particular candidates.” The editors agreed with the Court that
“Congress has broad authority in acting against the corrupting power
to move towards European standards for democratic elections.” Id. (internal
quotation marks omitted).
22
Editorial, Russians Inch Toward Democracy, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 2003, at A28.
23
Id.
24
William Safire, The Russian Reversion, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10, 2003, at A31.
25
Id.
26
See supra notes 21–23 and accompanying text.
27
Editorial, A Campaign Finance Triumph, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11, 2003, at A42.
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28

of money in politics.”
Dismissing constitutional objections to
reform, the editorial concluded, “Now that many of the constitutional
objections have been stripped away, Congress has a greater obligation
than ever to address what the court’s majority called ‘the ill effects of
29
aggregated wealth on our political system.’”
These two stories may be linked as follows: If one had to pick
from American political history the classic use of the popular
censorial power in the form of an insurgent political campaign, one
could find no better example than Senator Eugene McCarthy’s 1968
campaign against President Lyndon Johnson. Yet, that campaign
would not have been possible under subsequent campaign finance
restrictions. When interviewed in 1991, Senator McCarthy said that,
[b]y putting a $1,000 top limit on individual campaign
contributions, with matching funds from the federal government,
they made it harder for an insurgent candidate to make headway.
In 1968 we had several contributors who gave us $100,000 each.
What I say is that there would have been no American Revolution
30
if we’d been dependent on King George III for matching funds.

Bringing things full circle for our purposes, Senator McCarthy
concluded, “It’s getting worse, I think. It’s reached the point where
it’s easier to start a new political trend, or thought, in Russia than in
31
the US.”
The Russian election and McConnell decision, and the New York
Times’ editorial reaction to them, turn out to have quite a lot in
common. Both manifest a preference for the reduction of big money
influence in politics over a concern for free speech and other selfgovernment interests. Both diminish liberty in the name of a dubious
effort at promoting equality and combating corruption. They
represent, in Dr. Johnson’s memorable phrase, “the triumph of hope
32
over experience.” And, just as Mr. Safire provided the necessary
experiential corrective to his editors’ hope-blinded optimism about
the Russian legislative election, I seek here to do the same
concerning the widespread wishful thinking about campaign finance
28

Id.
Id. (quoting McConnell, 540 U.S. at 224 (opinion of Stevens & O’Connor, JJ.)).
30
John Lichfield, Notebook: Square Pegs Aim for the Oval Office, INDEPENDENT
(London), Dec. 29, 1991, at 19.
31
Id.
32
2 JAMES BOSWELL, BOSWELL’S LIFE OF JOHNSON 128 (George Birkbeck Hill ed.,
Oxford Univ. Press 1971 prtg. of 1934 ed.) (1791). I confess that I would have used
this as my Article’s title had I not been scooped by another campaign finance reform
critic. See James H. Warner, The Triumph of Hope over Experience: The Bipartisan
Campaign Reform Act of 2002 and the First Amendment, 13 GEO. MASON U. CIV. RTS. L.J. 1
(2003).
29
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reform. As Justice Holmes famously reminded us, preservation of our
freedom of speech (as well as of our other freedoms) requires
33
“eternal[] vigilan[ce].”
Such vigilance is not compatible with
wishful thinking in the face of threats to our constitutional liberties.
THE CENTRAL MEANING OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT
Madison’s censorial power maxim, introducing this Article,
arises again as we turn to American constitutional history in order to
34
explore “the central meaning of the First Amendment.” By “central
meaning,” following Professor Kalven, I mean “a core of protection of
speech without which democracy cannot function . . . [and] not the
35
whole meaning of the Amendment.” It accounts for what Edmond
36
Cahn calls “the firstness of the First Amendment” and it is a
recurrent theme in the rhetoric of a diverse number of formative
First Amendment documents and events (especially those involving
37
the Sedition Act), as well as in such cases as Abrams v. United States
38
and New York Times Co. v. Sullivan.
Truth be told, the censorial power of the people was in some
doubt during the formative period of the Constitution and the
question came to a head when the Adams administration brought
39
about the enactment of the Sedition Act of 1798, which criminalized
the production of “any false, scandalous and malicious writing or
40
writings against the government of the United States.” Despite its
lack of defenders today, numerous historians and commentators have
41
judged the act to be constitutional. At the time, even the great John
42
Marshall spoke favorably of the act and its constitutionality. But the
43
Instead, the defense of the
act’s supporters have not prevailed.
33

Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 273 (1964).
35
Harry Kalven, Jr., The New York Times Case: A Note on “The Central Meaning of
the First Amendment”, 1964 SUP. CT. REV. 191, 208.
36
Edmond Cahn, The Firstness of the First Amendment, 65 YALE L.J. 464, 481 (1956).
37
250 U.S. 616 (1919).
38
376 U.S. 254 (1964).
39
Ch. 74, 1 Stat. 596 (expired 1801).
40
Id.
41
See Kalven, supra note 35, at 206 (collecting authorities).
42
See John Marshall, Report of the Minority on the Virginia Resolutions, 6 J. HOUSE OF
DELEGATES (VA.) 93–95 (1798–99), reprinted in 5 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION 136–
39 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987).
43
As Justice Brennan said, writing for the Court in Sullivan, “Although the
Sedition Act was never tested in this Court, the attack upon its validity has carried the
34
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people’s censorial power by Madison and other Republicans against
the Sedition Act became the basis for our free speech traditions.
The Virginia Resolutions of 1798, for example, expressed worry
that the Sedition Act claimed for the federal government “a power
which, more than any other, ought to produce universal alarm,
because it is levelled against the right of freely examining public
characters and measures, and of free communication among the
people thereon, which has ever been justly deemed the only effectual
44
guardian of every other right.”
In his report on the Virginia
Resolutions, Madison reminded his colleagues that “the right of
electing the members of government constitutes more particularly
the essence of a free and responsible government. The value and
efficacy of the right depends on . . . examining and discussing [the]
45
merits and demerits of the candidates . . . .”
The Sedition Act itself was never the subject of constitutional
evaluation by the Supreme Court because it expired before it could
be challenged, but the issue of its propriety and of Madison’s notion
of the people’s censorial power has run through a number of
46
important free speech cases, among them Abrams v. United States,
decided just after World War I. Abrams involved a conspiracy
prosecution under the Espionage Act against five aliens who had
made and distributed circulars opposing American intervention in
47
Russia after the outbreak of the Russian revolution.
The Court
upheld the convictions, but Justice Holmes dissented:
I wholly disagree with the argument of the Government that the
First Amendment left the common law as to seditious libel in
force. History seems to me against the notion. I had conceived
that the United States through many years had shown its
48
repentance for the Sedition Act of 1798 . . . .

Yet, despite the Virginia Resolutions and Justice Holmes’ Abrams
dissent, “until its disposition by the Times case, the status of the
49
Sedition Act of 1798 remained an open question.” I turn now to
that case in order to close the question.
On its face, New York Times v. Sullivan is a simple libel action over
day in the court of history.” Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 276 (citation omitted).
44
James Madison, Report on the Virginia Resolutions (1800), in 4 DEBATES ON THE
ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 546, 554 (Jonathan Elliot ed., Ayer Co. 1987
prtg. of 2d ed.) [hereinafter ELLIOT’S DEBATES].
45
4 id. at 575.
46
250 U.S. 616 (1919).
47
See Abrams, 250 U.S. at 617–21.
48
Id. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
49
Kalven, supra note 35, at 206.
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a newspaper advertisement that was critical of a public official,
brought by the official against those who placed the advertisement
50
and the newspaper that published it. But, at base, the case raises the
same fundamental constitutional questions about self-government
and the censorial power that aroused Madison’s ire in 1794. At the
heart of this simple libel action, Justice Brennan keenly saw a threat
to the very censorial power that had been imperiled shortly after the
Founding by the Sedition Act and wisely framed his argument to
address the renewed threat.
Justice Brennan introduced his discussion of the Act by stating,
“The general proposition that freedom of expression upon public
questions is secured by the First Amendment has long been settled by
51
our decisions.” Relating this notion to the case at hand, he famously
wrote, “Thus we consider this case against the background of a
profound national commitment to the principle that debate on
52
public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open . . . .”
After rehearsing some relevant history and precedent, the
centerpiece of his opinion was the assertion in the Virginia
Resolutions of 1798 that the censorial power was “the only effectual
53
guardian of every other right.” These principles, Justice Brennan
believed, compelled the conclusion “that the Act, because of the
restraint it imposed upon the criticism of government and public
54
officials, was inconsistent with the First Amendment.”
Applying the principles forged in the crucible of the Sedition
Act controversy to the alleged libel in Sullivan, the Court announced,
“What a state may not constitutionally bring about by means of a
55
criminal statute is likewise beyond the reach of its civil law of libel.”
The Court correctly went on to hold that the censorial privilege of
56
the people thus recognized extended even to honest misstatement.
Commentators quickly realized that Sullivan was a landmark
opinion. Professor Kalven, for example, asserted in an influential
article that “[t]he exciting possibilities in the Court’s opinion derive
50

For a full statement of the facts of the case, see New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,
376 U.S. 254, 256–61 (1964).
51
Id. at 269.
52
Id. at 270.
53
Id. at 273 (quoting Madison, in 4 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 44, at 554); see
supra text accompanying note 44.
54
Id. at 276.
55
Id. at 277.
56
See id. at 278.
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from its emphasis on seditious libel and the Sedition Act of 1798 as
57
the key to the meaning of the First Amendment.” The significance
of the holding was not merely the resolution of a long-standing
58
question of legal history, but more importantly the specification by
the Supreme Court, at long last, of the core meaning and purpose of
the First Amendment. Professor Kalven encapsulated that meaning
when he commented that “[t]he touchstone of the First Amendment
has become the abolition of seditious libel and what that implies
about the function of free speech on public issues in American
59
democracy.” And what are these implications? Kalven answers this
question, I believe, when he says, “[T]he opinion almost literally
incorporated Alexander Meiklejohn’s thesis that in a democracy the
60
citizen as ruler is our most important public official.”
Professor Kalven’s assertion was confirmed the following year
when Justice Brennan gave the Alexander Meiklejohn Lecture at
61
Brown University. In that lecture, Brennan summarized the kernel
of Meiklejohn’s teaching on the First Amendment: “The first
amendment, in his view, is the repository of those self-governing
powers that, because they are exclusively reserved to the people, are
by force of that amendment immune from regulation by the
agencies, federal and state, that are established as the people’s
62
servants.” Justice Brennan believed Meiklejohn would agree that
63
“[f]reedom of expression in areas of public affairs is an absolute.”
Justice Brennan then proceeded to lay out some of the principles
Meiklejohn had derived from this position. Of those principles, the
most relevant to our concerns is the principle whereby “[t]he
revolutionary intent of the First Amendment is, then, to deny to all
subordinate agencies authority to abridge the freedom of the
64
electoral power of the people.” In this, Meiklejohn’s position tracks
65
that of Madison and the Virginia Resolutions of 1798.
Unfortunately, as we will see later, Meiklejohn’s position goes beyond
this Madisonian core to also embrace some managerial views of self57

Kalven, supra note 35, at 204.
As Kalven puts it, “until its disposition by the Times case, the status of the
Sedition Act of 1798 remained an open question.” Id. at 206.
59
Id. at 209.
60
Id.
61
William J. Brennan, Jr., The Supreme Court and the Meiklejohn Interpretation of the
First Amendment, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1965).
62
Id. at 11–12.
63
Id. at 12.
64
Id. at 13 (quoting Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is an Absolute,
1961 SUP. CT. REV. 245, 254).
65
See supra notes 1, 16, 44, 45, 53 and accompanying text.
58
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government that have relevance to the campaign finance debate.
It is not very difficult to apply this view of the “the central
meaning of the First Amendment” to campaign finance reform. Nor
does it want for expositors. Many of the features of such a
conception have already been noted elsewhere in Supreme Court
opinions and law review articles. I have merely collected them, the
better to contemplate what one might call “campaign finance reform
according to New York Times v. Sullivan.” What follows is a sketch of
some of the main points of this notion.
In an approach to campaign finance reform that highly values
the people’s censorial power and views it as the central meaning of
the First Amendment, all aspects of campaign finance would be
presumptively strongly protected activity. While their constitutional
67
protection might not be absolute, government restrictions on
68
campaign finance activity would be strictly scrutinized. Although
these precise terms were not used in Sullivan because they had not
yet passed into common parlance, this was essentially the standard
used by the Court when it held that defamation rules relating to
69
criticism of public officials must meet an “actual malice” standard.
Exceptions to this standard would likewise be strictly scrutinized,
lest they improperly discriminate based on content or viewpoint. No
individual or entity, rich or poor, private party or PAC, would be
prohibited from engaging in campaign finance activity unless the
regulations failed the actual malice test. This stringency would apply
to dollar limits as well as to outright bans on various campaign
finance activities, since both would constitute infringements of
constitutionally protected activity. Because of the level of scrutiny
66

For example, Justice Brennan says that “Dr. Meiklejohn’s view did not mean
that the agencies of government had no role and that the first amendment protected
a freedom to speak at any time and place.” Brennan, supra note 61, at 13. For an
excellent exposition of these aspects of Meiklejohn’s view of free expression, see
generally Robert Post, Meiklejohn’s Mistake: Individual Autonomy and the Reform of Public
Discourse, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 1109 (1993).
67
Meiklejohn might have insisted to the contrary. See Meiklejohn, supra note 64.
68
Thus, the government would bear the burden of showing that such regulations
served a compelling interest in the least restrictive manner possible.
69
The Court described the “actual malice” standard as follows:
The constitutional guarantees require, we think, a federal rule that
prohibits a public official from recovering damages for a defamatory
falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the
statement was made with ‘actual malice’—that is, with knowledge that
it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279–80.
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applied, no deference would be given to Congressional findings
because such deference would be inappropriate in a strict scrutiny
setting. For the same reason, with respect to the evil being fought, a
quid pro quo definition of corruption would be required since
anything short of that would not be the least restrictive means of
pursuing a compelling governmental interest, for only a quid pro quo
definition of corruption would meet the “actual corruption” standard
this view would require analogously to Sullivan’s “actual malice”
standard. Anything broader than that would not be narrowly enough
tailored.
One consequence of this approach to campaign finance
restrictions would be that merely avoiding the appearance of
corruption would not be a sufficiently weighty interest to justify
limitation of protected campaign finance activity. Such appearance is
often in the eye of the beholder and deprivation of constitutional
rights ought to be based on objective fact rather than subjective,
perhaps biased, perception. And even if objectivity were attainable
(for example, through a reasonable person standard), there would
remain an intractable problem with the least-restrictive-means prong
of the test since an appearance-based standard would effectively
disable the protection normally offered by this requirement. Because
strict scrutiny would be applied to campaign finance regulations, the
government would also have to show that the measures imposed were
the least restrictive alternatives with respect to impinging upon the
protected activity. As a result, in order to justify bans, limits, and
disclosure requirements, the government would have to demonstrate
why non-suppressive alternatives such as subsidies, vouchers, and free
airtime would not work to achieve legislative aims. For absent
demonstration that non-suppressive alternatives do not work, there
can be no showing, as strict scrutiny requires, that alternatives which
suppress speech are truly necessary to achieve government’s
compelling anticorruption rationale in campaign finance regulation.
One significant result of an approach like that sketched above
would likely be the realization of just how far the Court’s decisions
increasingly depart from “the central meaning of the First
Amendment.” I will now put this notion to use by comparing it first
to the earliest and most censorial, power-friendly modern campaign
70
finance reform decision, Buckley v. Valeo, and then to later campaign
finance reform cases, culminating in McConnell.
In Buckley, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the

70

424 U.S. 1 (1976).
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71

Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971.
The Court’s Buckley
opinion is clearly of two minds about the Sullivan conception of the
central meaning of the First Amendment, juxtaposing as it does
echoes of Sullivan’s stirring rhetoric with statements that are flatly at
odds with the Madisonian tradition in Sullivan. This is because
Buckley, at its core, is a compromise decision, founded upon a basic
distinction between the constitutional protection afforded to
campaign expenditures on the one hand, and to campaign
contributions on the other. The Buckley Court expressed great
concern about the free expression consequences of the campaign
expenditure limits there in question:
A restriction on the amount of money a person or group can
spend on political communication during a campaign necessarily
reduces the quantity of expression by restricting the number of
issues discussed, the depth of their exploration, and the size of
the audience reached. This is because virtually every means of
communicating ideas in today’s mass society requires the
expenditure of money. . . .
The expenditure limitations contained in the Act represent
substantial rather than merely theoretical restraints on the
72
quantity and diversity of political speech. . . .

Only a page or so later, the Court expresses much less constitutional
concern over contribution limitations: “By contrast with a limitation
upon expenditures for political expression, a limitation upon the
amount that any one person or group may contribute to a candidate
or political committee entails only a marginal restriction upon the
73
contributor’s ability to engage in free communication.”
That the Court’s crabbed view of the constitutional protection
for campaign contributions is inconsistent with the robust Sullivan
conception of free expression rights is clear when contrasted with an
assertion by Ralph Winter, co-counsel for the plaintiff in Buckley, that
“[a] limit on the amount an individual may contribute to a political
campaign is a limit on the amount of political activity in which he
74
may engage.” The Buckley Court countenances what the Sullivan
71

Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972) (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C.A. §§
431–42 (West 2005)).
72
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 19.
73
Id. at 20.
74
Ralph K. Winter, Jr., Money, Politics and the First Amendment, in CAMPAIGN
FINANCES: TWO VIEWS OF THE POLITICAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS 45, 60 (2d
prtg. 1972). This statement closely tracks the Court’s view of campaign expenditures
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Court rejects—the existence of different grades of political activity
and different modes of criticism of public officials (and
corresponding differences in the degree of protection for these
activities). So, the Buckley Court overruled the appellate court’s
classification of contributions and expenditures as conduct rather
75
than speech only in the case of expenditures. For the Court, this
76
difference turned on the requisite level of constitutional scrutiny.
Lesser scrutiny will necessarily be accompanied by greater deference
to Congress because, by definition, it is less searching than strict
scrutiny.
In contrast to the several distinctions propounded by the Court
as a consequence of its constitutional analysis, the Buckley Court saw
one main anticorruption purpose behind both the Act in question
and its holdings. In discussing contribution limits, for example, the
Court said, “It is unnecessary to look beyond the Act’s primary
purpose to limit the actuality and appearance of corruption resulting
from large individual financial contributions in order to find a
constitutionally sufficient justification for the $1,000 contribution
77
limitation.” Yet, in an important sense, the anticorruption purpose
78
has two parts: the prevention of quid pro quo bribery and avoiding
“the appearance of corruption stemming from public awareness of
the opportunities for abuse inherent in a regime of large individual
79
financial contributions.” The first involves actual corruption, the
second only the suspicion thereof.
CORRUPTION, EQUALITY, AND CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM
Because it was an inconsistent, compromise decision, Buckley was
subject to strong and contrary pressures. Over time, these pressures
have not proven to be of equal force, and the Court has been pushed
ever farther from a Sullivan approach to campaign finance reform, as
most recently demonstrated in McConnell. This trend increasingly
imperils constitutional self-rule and the people’s censorial power.

rather than of contributions. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
75
“We cannot share the view that the present Act’s contribution and expenditure
limitations are comparable with the restrictions on conduct upheld in O’Brien. The
expenditure of money simply cannot be equated with such conduct as destruction of
a draft card.” Buckley, 424 U.S. at 16.
76
“Yet this Court has never suggested that the dependence of a communication
on the expenditure of money operates itself to introduce a nonspeech element or to
reduce the exacting scrutiny required by the First Amendment.” Id.
77
Id. at 26.
78
See id. at 26–27.
79
Id. at 27.
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The reason why this is so, however, is not readily apparent from the
Court’s opinions themselves because Buckley has not been overruled.
The Court continues to use the same terminology, recognizing
corruption as the primary evil to be combated by campaign finance
reform. But beneath the surface, a tectonic shift is occurring as the
Court departs more and more from “the central meaning of the First
Amendment” and adopts a more egalitarian, collectivist, and
managerial view of the subject. The shift here is from a libertarian
view of the First Amendment rights involved to a more egalitarian
80
view. A second difference between these two approaches is that the
libertarian view is individualistic, focusing on personal liberty, while
81
the egalitarian view looks more at “the people, as a collectivity.” As a
result, substantial functional change in the constitutional standards
governing campaign finance reform has come about even while the
rules themselves have remained nominally the same. And now with
the passage of the BCRA, the statute in question in McConnell, the
underlying statutory rules have changed too.
I will not here attempt a comprehensive analysis and critique of
McConnell, but rather will examine McConnell’s departure from “the
central meaning of the First Amendment” and the harm that flows
from that departure by focusing on the elusive, but central concept of
corruption. For this one concept circumscribes all the main
difficulties with the now dominant constitutional forces in this area.
The debate and disagreement over this important notion is spread
both vertically, over the course of campaign finance decisions over
the years, and horizontally, within the conflicting opinions and
82
definitions offered by the justices in individual cases like McConnell.
We have already seen that Buckley itself offered twin definitions
83
of corruption as quid pro quo bribery and as an undesirable
80

Edward B. Foley describes the contrast between the two approaches as follows:
“The egalitarian vision wants limits on the amount of money spent on election
campaigns in an effort to equalize the financial influence of all voters in the electoral
process. The libertarian vision opposes such limits on the ground that they would
interfere with the freedom of voters to use their own money to publicize their
political views.” Edward B. Foley, Philosophy, the Constitution, and Campaign Finance, 10
STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 23, 23 (1998).
81
Robert Post, Equality and Autonomy in First Amendment Jurisprudence, 95 MICH. L.
REV. 1517, 1520 (1997) (reviewing OWEN FISS, LIBERALISM DIVIDED: FREEDOM OF
SPEECH AND THE MANY USES OF STATE POWER (1996)).
82
For a good, brief discussion of the concept of corruption and its important
role in the campaign finance debate, see David A. Strauss, What Is the Goal of
Campaign Finance Reform?, 1995 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 141, 142–49.
83
See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
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84

appearance inhering in large contributions.
Both notions were
developed in subsequent cases. In Federal Election Commission v.
85
National Conservative Political Action Committee, for example, the Court
struck down a presidential election spending limit because it lacked
an adequate anticorruption basis. This was a result of the Court
86
employing the narrower of the two Buckley corruption definitions. If
the Court had adopted the more expansive view, large contributions
might well have been found to create the appearance of (in the sense
of a potential for) corruption.
A much broader view was taken a few years later in Austin v.
87
Michigan Chamber of Commerce, a case concerning corporate
campaign expenditures. Setting to one side the quid pro quo
conception of corruption, the Court said, “Michigan’s regulation
aims at a different type of corruption in the political arena: the
corrosive and distorting effects of immense aggregations of wealth
that are accumulated with the help of the corporate form and that
have little or no correlation to the public’s support for the
88
corporation’s political ideas.” A later case, Nixon v. Shrink Missouri
89
Government PAC, involving a state election contribution limit,
defined corruption even more expansively to include “the broader
threat from politicians too compliant with the wishes of large
90
contributors.”
Corruption was also an important focus of the BCRA. After
91
starting with a reaffirmation of the money–corruption linkage, the
Court proceeded to expand the already broad notion of corruption.
For example, to the notions of bribery, appearance of impropriety,
corrosive effect, and excessive compliance, the Court now added the
92
dangers of privileged access to candidates and officeholders, and

84

See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
470 U.S. 480 (1985).
86
“The hallmark of corruption is the financial quid pro quo: dollars for political
favors.” Id. at 497.
87
494 U.S. 652 (1990).
88
Id. at 659–60.
89
528 U.S. 377 (2000).
90
Id. at 389. This passage was cited with approval in McConnell. McConnell, 540
U.S. at 143 (opinion of Stevens & O’Connor, JJ.).
91
“We all know that money is the chief source of corruption.” McConnell, 540
U.S. at 116 n.2 (opinion of Stevens & O’Connor, JJ.).
92
The Court noted that the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs
“concluded that both parties promised and provided special access to candidates and
senior Government officials in exchange for large soft-money contributions.” Id. at
130 (opinion of Stevens & O’Connor, JJ.).
85
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erosion of public confidence in the process. So low, apparently, is
the level of scrutiny being applied to the provisions under review that
94
95
even potential appearances and small likelihoods of occurrence
are adequate to justify campaign finance restrictions.
This broad definition of corruption combined with a reduced
96
level of scrutiny creates a dangerous double deference in which the
evil to be demonstrated is so subjective and amorphous, and the level
of proof so low that mere assertion (at least by Congressional experts)
of the evil is tantamount to proof of the evil. Add to that the irony of
what might be called the new liar’s paradox in which the politician is
trusted only to vouch for his own corruption. This irony seems a slim
reed on which to build the edifice of a constitutional campaign
finance law.
And so it is, for the ever expanding notion of corruption not
only drives the law, but is in turn itself driven by an egalitarian
participatory view of the values at issue here. For although Buckley
97
famously denied the relevance of equality interests in this context,
93

The Court wrote:
Our treatment of contribution restrictions reflects more than the
limited burden they impose on First Amendment freedoms. It also
reflects the importance of the interests that underlie contribution
limits—interests in preventing “both the actual corruption threatened
by large financial contributions and the eroding of public confidence
in the electoral process through the appearance of corruption.”
Id. at 136 (opinion of Stevens & O’Connor, JJ.) (quoting Fed. Election Comm’n v.
Nat’l Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197, 208 (1982)).
94
“Take away Congress’ authority to regulate the appearance of undue influence
and ‘the cynical assumption that large donors call the tune could jeopardize the
willingness of voters to take part in democratic governance.’” Id. at 144 (opinion of
Stevens & O’Connor, JJ.) (quoting Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 390
(2000)).
95
“Even if it occurs only occasionally, the potential for such undue influence is
manifest. And unlike straight cash-for-votes transactions, such corruption is neither
easily detected nor practical to criminalize. The best means of prevention is to
identify and to remove the temptation.” Id. at 153 (opinion of Stevens & O’Connor,
JJ.).
96
I take the phrase “double deference” from Richard Epstein, who uses it in a
different sense. See Richard A. Epstein, McConnell v. Federal Election Commission:
A Deadly Dose of Double Deference, 3 ELECTION L.J. 231, 233 (2004) (observing that the
first round of deference involves the “question of what it is that legislators . . . should
do in the first place” while the second round of deference “arises in part because of
the Supreme Court itself, which, in its relaxation of the protection of property rights
and economic liberties, has created an unnecessary increase in the opportunities for
politicians to trade on their office”).
97
“But the concept that government may restrict the speech of some elements of
our society in order to enhance the relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the
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the more recent, broader concerns of the Court with access,
influence, and large contributions arise out of a fear of the inequality
98
they represent or threaten. The doctrinal and textual source of the
99
goal of equality in campaign finance is the Equal Protection Clause,
rather than the First Amendment, or it is at least an egalitarian
100
reading of the First Amendment.
Most famously, the relation of
equal protection to the electoral process appears in the “one person,
101
one vote” standard of Reynolds v. Sims. All that the equal protection
view of campaign finance reform seems to require is the small step of
expanding “one person, one vote” from the act of voting itself to the
whole electoral process, thus equalizing voters’ ability to influence
election results indirectly by equalizing their ability to engage in
electoral expression as well as their ability to influence results directly
by casting their votes.
This would entail using weaker First
Amendment standards for electoral expression than would apply to
all other forms of protected speech. Advocates of this approach
102
embrace this step under the title of “electoral exceptionalism.”
But electoral exceptionalism would be a step too far. It would
distort the constitutional concepts it now informs, would fail in its
leveling purpose, and worst of all, would threaten popular selfgovernment and the censorial power. One example of this distortion
is manifested in the Court’s stretching of the notion of corruption
103
beyond all recognition. An egalitarian reform of campaign finance
would fail for two reasons. First, as the McConnell Court itself admits,
there is no reason to expect “that BCRA will be the last congressional
statement on the matter. Money, like water, will always find an
104
outlet.”
Second, even if all the leaks could be plugged, an
egalitarian campaign finance utopia would not result. Removal of big
money from the process would only further enhance the not wholly
benign influences of incumbents, celebrities, those with access to
First Amendment . . . .” Buckley, 424 U.S. at 48–49.
98
For more on the relation of corruption and inequality, see generally Strauss,
supra note 82, at 142–49.
99
“No state shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
100
See generally Kenneth L. Karst, Equality as a Central Principle in the First
Amendment, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 20 (1975).
101
377 U.S. 533 (1964). For a discussion linking Reynolds to the campaign finance
context, see generally Owen M. Fiss, Money and Politics, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 2470,
2474–76 (1997).
102
See, e.g., Frederick Schauer & Richard H. Pildes, Electoral Exceptionalism and the
First Amendment, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1803 (1999).
103
See supra text accompanying notes 77–96.
104
McConnell, 540 U.S. at 224 (opinion of Stevens & O’Connor, JJ.).
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volunteer labor, and the media, rather than equalize the voices of
voters of all income levels. Above all, though, the egalitarian drift of
Court and commentators would imperil self-rule and the censorial
power by, in Meiklejohn’s words, giving “subordinate agencies
authority to abridge the freedom of the electoral power of the
105
people.”
The egalitarian view of the First Amendment has not yet had its
Justice Brennan or its New York Times v. Sullivan. And if what has
been argued here is persuasive, it never should. For the allure of the
egalitarian, managerial, and collectivist approach to electoral
expression and campaign finance regulation is completely undercut
by its incompatibility with the censorial power of the people and the
central meaning of the First Amendment. The error of this theory is,
in fact, identical to that of the New York Times editorial writers in
celebrating the electoral victory in December 2003 of parties
supporting President Vladimir Putin over those supported by the rich
106
oligarchs.
Both views focus on and seek the limitation of private
moneyed power in elections while completely overlooking, if not
actually welcoming, the greater danger created by the governmental
suppression of liberty, especially freedom of speech, needed to curb
that private power.
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106

Meiklejohn, supra note 64, at 254.
See supra text accompanying notes 20–26.

